

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

Gordon D. Schaber Superior Court

<p>Election Integrity Project California, Inc. et al Plaintiff/Petitioner(s) VS. Shirley Weber, California Secretary of State et al Defendant/Respondent(s)</p>	<p>No. 24WM000168 Date: 05/28/2025 Time: 3:26 PM Dept: 21 Judge: Shelleyanne W.L. Chang</p> <p>ORDER re: Ruling on Submitted Matter</p>
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The Court, having taken the matter under submission on 05/16/2025, now rules as follows:

For ease of review, the Court has reproduced its tentative ruling below, except for a few typographical errors, which the Court has corrected for clarity.

A. TENTATIVE RULING

I. Factual And Procedural Background

As this is a demurrer, the Court considers the allegations pled in the Petition to be true.

Petitioner Election Integrity Project California, Inc. (“EIPCa”) is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit public benefit corporation doing business in the State of California. (FAP, ¶ 7.) Petitioner Larry Lewis is resident of Los Angeles County, and is a United States Citizen over eighteen years of age.

On February 27, 2024, EIPCa submitted an application to the California Secretary of State for the “voter list or file” maintained by the elections officials for each precinct of all voters who voted in previous elections. (FAP ¶ 18.) The application requested each voter’s name, address, birthdate, state Registration ID number, precinct, voting method, and current registration status. (*Ibid.*)

The Secretary of State’s office sent EIPCa non-responsive data on several occasions. (FAP ¶ 19.) After numerous emails and phone calls, EIPCa received what it refers to as the June 2024 Accounting, containing the voter history and voter information files of those who voted in the November 2022 election. (*Ibid.*) EIPCa conducted an audit of this data, and found “major discrepancies” between this and the November 8, 2022 Voter Participation Statistics. (FAP ¶¶ 20-21.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

Gordon D. Schaber Superior Court

EIPCa sent a certified letter on September 6, 2024 to the Secretary of State setting forth its concerns and requesting “answers to its questions regarding the discrepancies.” (FAP ¶¶ 29-30.) The letter asked questions including:

1. Why the total number of ballots provided by the Secretary’s office in June 2024 exceeds the number in the certification and what procedures were used to reconcile these differences;
2. Why certain counties had fewer ballots, and other counties had more ballots than listed in the certification;
3. Whether registrants with multiple ballots attributable to their voter registration ID voted or attempted to vote twice in the November 8, 2022, election;
4. What corrective action the Secretary’s office has taken regarding voters who appeared to have voted more than once;
5. Why the VoteCal system permits entry of multiple ballots for one registrant in an election and the course of action planned to correct this problem; and
6. How “confidential registrants” votes are counted and how many such ballots were counted. (FAP ¶ 30.)

EIPCa sent a second letter on September 20, 2024. To date, the Secretary of State has not provided answers to the questions posed in the September 6, 2024 letter. (FAP ¶ 31.)

With respect to the Secretary of State, Petitioners request the Court issue a writ of mandate ordering Respondent to respond to Petitioner’s questions in the September 6, 2024 letter, and order Respondent to “provide EIPCa with an accurate and finalized list of the 16,140,044 state voters whose ballots were cast and counted in the November 2024 general election, their state Registration ID numbers, the methods by which these ballots were cast, and the counties and precincts in which the voters resided at the time they voted to align with the 2024 Voter Participation Statistics published at the time of certification.” (FAP, p. 23-24.)

II. Standard

A. Demurrer

A defendant may demur to the entire complaint or any of the causes of action within it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.50(a).) In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a demurrer, the trial court considers the properly pleaded material facts and matters that may be judicially noticed and tests their sufficiency. (*Cedar Fair, L.P. v. County of Santa Clara* (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1158-59.) A court should not sustain a demurrer unless the complaint, liberally construed, fails to state a cause of action on any theory. Doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (*Kramer v. Intuit, Inc.* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 574, 578.) In reviewing a demurrer, the Court will not “assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law and may disregard allegations that are contrary to the law or to a fact of which judicial notice may be taken.” (*Cochran v. Cochran* (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 493.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

Gordon D. Schaber Superior Court

The burden is on a petitioner to show in what manner it can amend the pleading and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading. (*Goodman v. Kennedy* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) “Leave to amend *should be denied* where the facts are not in dispute and the nature of the claim is clear, but no liability exists under substantive law.” (*Lawrence v. Bank of America* (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 431, 436 (emphasis added).)

B. Statutory interpretation

The interpretation of statutes is an issue of law on which the court exercises its independent judgment. (See, *Sacks v. City of Oakland* (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1082.) In exercising its independent judgment, the Court is guided by certain established principles of statutory construction, which may be summarized as follows. The primary task of the court in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. (See, *Hsu v. Abbara* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 871.) This extends to a challenge that a regulation exceeds the agency’s authority, although the Court gives great weight to the agency’s interpretation. (*Nick v. City of Lake Forest* (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 871.)

The starting point for the task of interpretation is the words of the statute itself, because they generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. (See, *Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103.) The language used in a statute is to be interpreted in accordance with its usual, ordinary meaning, and if there is no ambiguity in the statute, the plain meaning prevails. (See, *People v. Snook* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1215.) The court should give meaning to every word of a statute if possible, avoiding constructions that render any words surplus or a nullity. (See, *Reno v. Baird* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 658.) Statutes should be interpreted so as to give each word some operative effect. (See, *Imperial Merchant Services, Inc. v. Hunt* (2009) 47 Cal.4th 381, 390.)

Beyond that, the Court must consider particular statutory language in the context of the entire statutory scheme in which it appears, construing words in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where the language appears, and harmonizing the various parts of the statutory enactment by considering particular clauses or sections in the context of the whole. (See, *People v. Whaley* (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 779, 793.)

III. Discussion

A. Request for Judicial Notice

Respondent has filed a request for judicial notice concerning one document. Petitioners have not filed any opposition to this request. The request is **GRANTED**.

Petitioners have filed a request for judicial notice concerning four documents. Respondent has not filed any objections. The Court has reviewed the documents and finds judicial notice is appropriate as to Exhibits 1, 2, and 4, but not appropriate as to Exhibit 3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

Gordon D. Schaber Superior Court

Accordingly, the request is **GRANTED** as to Exhibits 1, 2, and 4, but **DENIED** as to Exhibit 3.

B. Elections Code section 2300

EIPCa alleges it made a request for, “answers to its questions regarding the discrepancies” pursuant to Elections Code section 2300, subdivision (a)(9)(B), and title 2 of the California Code of Regulations, sections 19001, 19003, 198008, and 19009. (FAP, ¶ 29.) EIPCa alleges it has “associational standing under the public interest exception to the beneficial interest requirement under California law because ‘the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty.’ (*Loeber v. Lakeside Joint School Dist.* (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 552, 573-75.)” (FAP, ¶ 14.)

The Secretary of State argues section 2300 does not apply to EIPCa’s request, as EIPCa is not a “voter” within the meaning of the Elections Code.

The Court notes that the parties frame the issue as one of “standing” in arguing whether Petitioners have stated a claim for relief within the meaning of section 2300. The Court finds the question is not whether EIPCa has “standing” but whether, accepting all allegations as true, EIPCa has alleged that the Secretary of State violated a mandatory ministerial duty imposed by section 2300. That is, whether EIPCa has properly alleged that a “voter” within the meaning of the Elections Code, asked questions regarding “elections procedures” to an “elections official” such that the “elections official” violated a mandatory ministerial duty by not responding to said questions. If the allegations in the FAP do not allege such conduct occurred, then the FAP fails to state a claim for relief. This is an issue independent of whether EIPCa may qualify for “public interest” standing to pursue a claim for relief that otherwise properly states a cause of action for violation of a mandatory ministerial duty.

Section 2300 provides, in full:

(a) All voters, pursuant to the California Constitution and this code, shall be citizens of the United States. There shall be a Voter Bill of Rights for voters, available to the public, which shall convey all of the following to voters:

(1)(A) You have the right to cast a ballot if you are a valid registered voter.

(B) A valid registered voter means a United States citizen who is a resident in this state, who is at least 18 years of age and not serving a state or federal prison term for conviction of a felony, and who is registered to vote at their current residence address.

(2) You have the right to cast a provisional ballot if your name is not listed on the voting rolls.

(3) You have the right to cast a ballot if you are present and in line at the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

Gordon D. Schaber Superior Court

polling place before the close of the polls.

(4) You have the right to cast a secret ballot free from intimidation.

(5)(A) You have the right to receive a new ballot if, before casting your ballot, you believe you made a mistake.

(B) If at any time before you finally cast your ballot, you feel you have made a mistake, you have the right to exchange the spoiled ballot for a new ballot. Vote by mail voters may also request and receive a new ballot if they return their spoiled ballot to an elections official before the closing of the polls.

(6) You have the right to receive assistance in casting your ballot, if you are unable to vote without assistance.

(7) You have the right to return a completed vote by mail ballot to any precinct in the county.

(8) You have the right to election materials in another language, if there are sufficient residents in your precinct to warrant production.

(9)(A) You have the right to ask questions about election procedures and observe the election process.

(B) You have the right to ask questions of the precinct board and elections officials regarding election procedures and to receive an answer or be directed to the appropriate official for an answer. However, if persistent questioning disrupts the execution of their duties, the precinct board or elections officials may discontinue responding to questions.

(10) You have the right to report any illegal or fraudulent activity to a local elections official or to the Secretary of State's office.

(b) Beneath the Voter Bill of Rights there shall be listed a toll-free telephone number to call if a person has been denied a voting right or to report election fraud or misconduct.

(c) The Secretary of State may do both of the following:

(1) Develop regulations to implement and clarify the Voter Bill of Rights set forth in subdivision (a).

(2) Revise the wording of the Voter Bill of Rights as necessary to ensure

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

Gordon D. Schaber Superior Court

the use of clear and concise language free from technical terms.

(d) The Voter Bill of Rights set forth in subdivisions (a) and (b) shall be made available to the public before each election and on election day, at a minimum, as follows:

(1) The Voter Bill of Rights shall be printed in the state voter information guide, pursuant to Section 9084, in a minimum of 12-point type. Subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), subparagraph (B) of paragraph (5) of subdivision (a), and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (9) of subdivision (a) may be printed in a smaller point type than the rest of the Voter Bill of Rights.

(2) Posters or other printed materials containing the Voter Bill of Rights shall be included in precinct supplies pursuant to Section 14105.

Pursuant to section 359, “voter” within the meaning of the Elections Code is “any elector who is registered” under the Elections Code. Pursuant to section 321, subdivision (a), an “elector” is a “person who is a United States citizen 18 years of age or older and, except as specified in subdivision (b), is a resident of an election precinct in this state on or before the day of an election.” Organizations do not have the right to vote or to hold public office, and thus do not qualify as “electors.” (See *Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs and Fair Competition v. Norris* (9th Cir. 2019) 782.F3d 520.) As EIPCa, the author of the September 6, 2024 letter, is not a “voter” within the meaning of section 3200, the Secretary of State argues that it cannot seek a writ of mandate pursuant to this section.

Petitioners argue that, “if the Legislature intended to exclude organizations from asking questions or being directed to officials for answers, it would have expressly written ‘*Voters* have the right to ask questions...’” (Oppo., p 4.) (emphasis in original.) In support of this argument Petitioners cite to a case interpreting Maryland State law, and its interplay with the National Voter Registration Act. The Court does not find this authority persuasive in interpreting the plain language of California law. Petitioners also cite to *League of California Women Voters of California v. McPherson* (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1469. However, *League of California Women Voters of California* does not discuss standing or the definition of “voter.” Petitioners further acknowledge that *League of California Women Voters of California* was brought by three individuals, in concert with three organizations. There is no evidence that a particular cause of action or claim was unique to one of the involved organizations, nor that any party raised the question of standing as is at issue here. “A case is not authority for a proposition not considered therein or an issue not presented by its own particular facts.” (*McConnell v. Advantest America, Inc.* (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 596, 611.)

Petitioners’ citation to *Election Integrity Project California, Inc v. Weber* (9th Cir. 2022) an unpublished Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision is also not persuasive. (2022 WL 16647768.) The Ninth Circuit only addressed EIPCa’s standing for purposes of Article III, and cited to allegations of a “credible fear of future harm based on the implementation and

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

Gordon D. Schaber Superior Court

enforcement of statutory and regulatory provisions by state officials...” The Ninth Circuit did not address whether EIPCa qualifies as a “voter” within the meaning of the Elections Code. The Court again reminds Petitioners that, “[a] case is not authority for a proposition not considered therein or an issue not presented by its own particular facts.” (*McConnell v. Adventest America, Inc.* (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 596, 611.)

Lastly, Petitioners argue EIPCa has “public interest standing” and cites to *Friends of Oceano Dunes, Inc. v. San Luis Obispo County Air Pollution Control District* (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 957, and *Loeber v. Lakeside Joint School Dist.* (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 552. The problem with these arguments is that the crux of EIPCa’s allegations are that the Secretary of State has a mandatory ministerial duty to respond to EIPCa’s questions in the September 6, 2024 letter. As explained above, the issue of standing is not relevant for purposes of deciding this demurrer.

The plain language of section 2300 subdivision (a) applies only to “all voters.” This limitation is repeated in the second sentence of subdivision (a), which specifies, again, that the Voter Bill of Rights is for “voters” and which conveys the enumerated rights to “voters.” Petitioners argue that if subdivision (a)(9)(B) was limited to voters within the meaning of the Elections Code, the Legislature should have *again* included such limiting language specifically in subdivision (a)(9)(B). The Court finds such an interpretation ignores the clear intent and plain meaning of the introductory language contained in subdivision (a). The Legislature chose to limit the “Voter Bill of Rights” to “voters” not once, not twice, but three times in subdivision (a).

As detailed above, the Court is required to give meaning to every word of a statute, without rendering any words surplus or a nullity. (See *Reno v. Baird* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 658.) Sections 359 and 321 define a “voter” as an individual person, not an organization. Giving meaning to the plain language of section 2300, subdivision (a) provides that all rights identified in the subdivisions under (a) are rights that are reserved to “voters.” No additional limiting language was required. The Court finds that the rights identified in Elections Code section 2300, subdivision (a) are rights held only by an individual voter.

Given the Court’s determination, for purposes of ruling on this demurrer, it declines to reach the Secretary of State’s further arguments that it is not a “precinct board” or “elections official” under the Elections Code, and that the questions posed in the September 6, 2024 letter did not concern “elections procedures.”

C. Elections Code section 2191, subdivision (a) – November 2024 Election

Petitioners seek a writ of mandate compelling the Secretary of State to provide EIPCa with an “accurate finalized list from the November 2024 election of the voters who ballots were case and counted in the election, the methods by which these ballots were cast, and the counties and precincts in which the voters resided at the time they voted to align with the numbers in the November 2022 Voter Participation Statistics published at the time of certification.” (FAP ¶ 93.) Petitioners allege entitlement to this information pursuant to Elections Code section 2191, subdivision (a).

Section 2191, subdivision (a) provides, “(a) Upon request, the elections official shall compile a voter list or file, by precinct, of all persons who voted in previous elections. This information shall be compiled in conjunction with the purge of voter registration files conducted

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

Gordon D. Schaber Superior Court

pursuant to Article 2 (commencing with Section 2220) of Chapter 3.” The Court emphasizes the language “upon request,” which suggests that a writ of mandate cannot be issued for a failure to comply with a mandatory ministerial duty if the moving party does not allege conduct triggering such mandatory ministerial duty. Here, an “elections official” must provide a voter list “upon request.” Petitioners have not alleged that, other than attempting to make such a request in the operative pleading, they requested the Secretary of State provide them with section 2191 information with regard to the November 2024 election.

As Petitioners have failed to allege that any such “request” was made prior to and separate from the request made in the FAP, they have not alleged an essential element of any claim that the Secretary of State failed to comply with a mandatory ministerial duty. In light of this finding, the Court need not address the Secretary of State’s argument that it does not have a mandatory ministerial duty pursuant to section 2191 because she is not an “elections official” within the meaning of section 2191.

IV. Conclusion

In the event a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend is routinely granted where there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state a viable cause of action. (*Goodman v. Kennedy* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The Court having found the FAP fails to state a claim for relief as to all relief sought against the Secretary of State, the demurrer is **SUSTAINED, with leave to amend**. Petitioners are granted leave to file an amended petition addressing the deficiencies raised in the demurrer as this is the first challenge to the pleadings, and the FAP does not “show on its face that it is incapable of amendment.” (*Temescal Water Co. v. Dep’t of Public Works* (44 Cal.2d 90, 107 [reversing order sustaining demurrer on failure to exhaust administrative remedies grounds without leave to amend].)

Petitioners may file and serve an amended petition no later than **May 27, 2025**. Although not required by statute or court rule, Petitioners are directed to present the clerk with a copy of this ruling at the time they file an amended petition to facilitate its filing. Respondents may file and serve a response thereto within 30 days of service of the amended petition, 35 days if served by mail.

B. FINAL RULING

The demurrer is **SUSTAINED, without leave to amend**.

At the hearing on this matter, Petitioners attempted to make arguments for the first time, including new citations to the FAP and associated declarations, new citations to legal authority, and an entirely new argument regarding equitable estoppel. The Court **has not considered any of these citations nor any of these arguments** in issuing this ruling. A court generally does *not* consider points raised for the first time at oral argument or on reply “absent a showing of good cause for the failure to present them earlier.” (*Allen v. City of Sacramento* (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.) “This rule is based on considerations of fairness – withholding a point until the closing brief deprives the opposing party of the opportunity to file a written response unless supplemental briefing is ordered.” (*Ibid.*) Petitioners did not make *any showing* as to why these arguments and citations could not have been presented to the Court as part of their opposition

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

Gordon D. Schaber Superior Court

briefing. Accordingly, the arguments and citations were improper and have not been considered by the Court.

For the same reason, the Court **did not consider Respondent's arguments urging the Court to deny leave to amend**. Respondent *did not* request oral argument or notify opposing counsel that Respondent wished to be heard on the motion. Pursuant to local rule 1.06, the Court's tentative ruling becomes the final ruling "unless a party desiring to be heard so advises the department clerk no later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing, and further advises the clerk that such party has notified the other side of its intention to appear." The Court only received a request for oral argument on this motion from Petitioners. The Court did not receive a request from Respondent. Accordingly, while Respondent was entitled to respond to Petitioners' arguments at oral argument, it was improper for Respondent to attempt to contest any portion of the tentative ruling at the hearing.

At the hearing on this matter, Petitioners continued to argue that EIPCa is a "voter" or an "elector" within the meaning of the Elections Code. For the reasons detailed in the tentative ruling, this argument is not persuasive. Petitioners urged the Court to consider the legislative history of the subject statutory provisions. The Court need not consider the legislative history in this matter, because there is no ambiguity in the cited provisions, and thus the plain language and meaning prevails. (See *Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103; *People v. Snook* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1215.) The plain language of the subject Elections Code sections establishes that the Voters Bill of Rights provides rights to individual voters, not organizations or associations. The Court, therefore, need not resort to the legislative history. In this matter, the FAP alleges that EIPCa sent the September 6, 2024 letter, *not* an individual California voter.^[1]

After consideration of Petitioners' arguments at oral argument, the Court, sua sponte, has decided to reconsider its tentative ruling to sustain the demurrer with leave to amend, and finds that leave to amend is not appropriate. The burden is on Petitioner to show in what manner it can amend the pleading and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading. (*Goodman v. Kennedy* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) "Leave to amend *should be denied* where the facts are not in dispute and the nature of the claim is clear, but no liability exists under substantive law." (*Lawrence v. Bank of America* (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 431, 436 (emphasis added).) Similarly, permitting leave to amend serves no useful purpose where the actions of a plaintiff, as set forth in the original complaint, cannot give rise to a cause of action. (*Mercury Cas. Co. v. Superior Court* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1035; *see also Banis Restaurant Design, Inc. v. Serrano* (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1044.)

In Petitioners' opposition to the demurrer, they provide no argument as to how they could amend the FAP to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for relief. For the first time at the hearing on this matter, Petitioners attempted to argue that they *could* allege facts regarding a section 2191 request, but did not provide *any* facts or cite to any evidence to establish such amendment could be made. With respect to section 2300, while acknowledging that the September 6, 2024 letter was sent by EIPCa and signed by Linda Paine (an individual not alleged to be a California voter), EIPCa argued that it could "add an individual petitioner" and "make some allegations" that the letter was sent by a California voter.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

Gordon D. Schaber Superior Court

Petitioners essentially propose to amend the FAP to present the Court with a sham pleading, by omitting the allegations that EIPCa sent the September 6, 2024 letter, and newly alleging that previously unidentified (including during oral argument) California voters actually drafted the subject letter. (See *Deveny v. Entropin, Inc.* (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 425-426.) Petitioners have not provided any explanation as to how such an amendment can be made in light of the current allegations regarding the September 6, 2024 letter. Petitioners should have provided such explanation as part of their opposition to the present motion if they sought leave to amend. Petitioners did not even attempt to carry this burden. Accordingly, the Court finds it would be improper to grant Petitioners leave to amend.


The Court makes no finding as to whether the Secretary of state has a mandatory ministerial duty to respond to questions from an individual California voter pursuant to Elections Code section 2300. This question is not properly before the Court as Petitioners did not allege that the Secretary of State failed to respond to a section 2300 inquiry made by a California voter.

Respondent Secretary of State, in accordance with Local Rule 1.06, is directed to prepare an order, incorporating this ruling as an exhibit to the order; submit them to counsel for Petitioners for approval as to form in accordance with Rule of Court 3.1312(a); and thereafter submit it to the Court for signature and entry in accordance with Rule of Court 3.1312(b).

^[1] At the hearing on this matter, Petitioners cited to the Declaration of Ellen Swensen, which declaration *does not* establish that Declarant Swensen helped draft the September 4, 2024 letter, nor signed the letter, nor that the letter was sent on her behalf.

Certificate of Mailing is attached.

Δατεδ: 05/28/2025



Shelleyanne W.L. Chang, Judge

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO	Reserved for Clerk's File Stamp
COURTHOUSE ADDRESS: Gordon D. Schaber Superior Court 720 Ninth Street, Sacramento, CA 95814	
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: Election Integrity Project California, Inc. et al	
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: Shirley Weber, California Secretary of State et al	
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING	CASE NUMBER: 24WM000168

I, the below-named Executive Officer/Clerk of the above-entitled court, do hereby certify that I am not a party to the cause herein, and that on this date I served the Order re: Ruling on Submitted Matter upon each party or counsel named below by placing the document for collection and mailing so as to cause it to be deposited in the United States mail at the courthouse in Sacramento, California, one copy of the original filed/entered herein in a separate sealed envelope to each address as shown below with the postage thereon fully prepaid, in accordance with standard court practices.

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Dated: 05/28/2025

By: */s/ M. Garcia*
M. Garcia, Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

SHORT TITLE: ELECTION INTEGRITY PROJECT
CALIFORNIA, INC., et al. vs SHIRLEY WEBER,
CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, et al.

CASE NUMBER: 24WM000168